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AVAILABILITY OF RESCISSION IN REDRESSING
CLAYTON ACT SECTION 7
VIOLATIONS--United States v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Company
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company,' the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that although a seller is technically not a viola-
tor of section 7 of the Clayton Act (the Act),' federal district courts may
order relief which directly affects the seller through the exercise of their
equity jurisdiction. The court further ruled that federal district courts
are not precluded, as a matter of law, from ordering the particular rem-
edy of rescission in acquisitions which violate section 7 of the Act. The
court concluded that rescission is available as a remedy under the equi-
table powers conferred on the courts by section 15 of the Act.' The
Coca-Cola case is of considerable significance in antitrust law; it repre-
sents the first time a federal circuit court has acknowledged the availa-
bility of the far-reaching remedy of rescission in acquisitions allegedly
violative of section 7.
1. 575 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 362 (1978).
2. The Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or
any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976). The section provides as follows:
The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction to prevent
and restrain violations of this Act, and it shall be the duty of the several United States
.attorneys, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to
institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceed-
ings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation
shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of shall have
been duly notified of such petition, the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the
hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition, and before final de-
cree, the court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as
shall be deemed just in the premises. Whenever it shall appear to the court before
which any such proceeding may be pending that the ends of justice require that other
parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned
whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not, and subpoenas to
that end may be served in any district by the marshal thereof.
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II. FACTS OF THE CASE
The Department of Justice brought suit against both the buyers and
sellers of a purified water company. The buyer-defendants were Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles (CCLA) and its wholly-owned sub-
sidiary, Arrowhead Puritas Waters, Inc. (Arrowhead). The seler-de-
fendants were A. M. Liquidating Co. and Aqua Media, Ltd. (Aqua
Media). All the defendants were engaged in the business of providing
high purity industrial water services.
In 1972, Aqua Media developed a secondary line of business when it
began manufacturing equipment for industrial water purification.
Thereafter, its board of directors decided that the company would ex-
pand primarily into this new line of business. In this posture, Arrow-
head negotiated the purchase of Aqua Media's original water services
business. A complete plan for Aqua Media's liquidation was then
adopted, and by December 23, 1976, the date on which the govern-
ment's action was filed, liquidating distributions of $2,091,000 had been
authorized and paid.4
On December 23, 1976, the government fied its action charging that
the acquisition of Aqua Media's original water services business by Ar-
rowhead was in violation of section 7 of the Act and sought remedies of
divestiture or rescission.5 Aqua Media moved in the alternative for dis-
missal, summary judgment, or an order striking the prayer for rescis-
sion on the grounds that section 7, by its terms, applied only to the
conduct of buyers in prohibited acquisitions and that section 15 limited
a court's equitable powers to those situations in which the challenged
acquisition had not yet been consummated. In any event, argued Aqua
Media, rescission was not an available remedy under section 7; and
even if rescission were an available remedy, it was not an appropriate
remedy under the particular facts of the case.
6
The district court denied Aqua Media's motions, whereupon the gov-
ernment moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction to prevent further implementation of the liquidation plan.
The district court issued a preliminary injunction 7 accompanied by ex-
4. It was estimated that an additional $1,394,000 remained to be distributed under the
liquidation plan. 575 F.2d at 226.
5. Divestiture refers to situations in which the buyer is required to rid itself of property,
securities or assets. Rescission, on the other hand, refers to situations in which both the
buyer and seller must be returned to the status quo as it existed prior to the acquisition. See
generally H. BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS AND CANCELLATION
OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS (2d ed. 1929) [hereinafter cited as H. BLACK].
6. 575 F.2d at 226. See note 7 infra.
7. The district court issued an order requiring Aqua Media to remain in a posture amena-
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tensive findings of fact and conclusions of law.8
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the holding of the district court, ini-
tially noted that it was confronted with a case of first impression in the
federal circuit courts? For this reason, and because of the early nature
of the appeal,"0 the court's review was conducted largely in the ab-
stract.I1
The court was hearing an interlocutory appeal from an injunction
preserving the status quo pendente lite.'" The objection to the injunc-
ble to the potential remedy of rescission in case the government ultimately prevailed on the
merits. Generally, such orders are issued by a court on the basis of the particular facts
present in the case before it. See FED. R. Crv. P. 65.
In ruling on motions for preliminary injunctions, the Ninth Circuit follows the test dis-
cussed in Gresham v. Chambers, 501 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1974), which provides that a prelimi-
nary injunction will be issued only upon "a clear showing of either (1) probable success on
the merits and possible irreparable injury, or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the
merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decid-
edly toward the party seeking the preliminary relief." Id. at 691. See Aguirre v. Chula
Vista Sanitary Service, 542 F.2d 779, 781 (9th Cir. 1976) ("This Circuit has adopted the
Gresham test.").
Aqua Media argued that since over two million dollars in funds had been distributed
subsequent to the acquisition, rescission would be an inappropriate remedy. The terse anal-
ysis employed by the Ninth Circuit in reviewing the district court's decision to grant prelimi-
nary relief is explained by the early procedural posture of the case: the court was not
reviewing a final order, but only an injunction to preserve the availability of the potential
remedy of rescission. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit could reverse the trial court's action
in issuing the injunction only if such action constituted an abuse of discretion, le., only if
under no conceivable circumstances could a final decree involving rescission ultimately be
permissible. 575 F.2d at 231. Under this standard, the Ninth Circuit found the district
court's action to be proper. Id at 231-32.
8. Factually, the district court judge concluded that rescission might be the only effective
remedy in the event that a violation ultimately was proven; divestiture could prove unwork-
able due to the lack of interested and available buyers. Legally, the judge concluded that it
was reasonably probable that the government would prevail on the merits, that the remedy
of rescission was available under § 7 of the Clayton Act, and that if rescission ultimately
proved to be the only effective remedy, the resultant economic hardships to the sellers would
not outweigh the public's interest in antitrust relief.
9. 575 F.2d at 227.
10. The court was not reviewing an actual order of rescission but rather a preliminary
injunction preserving the availability of rescission. See note 7 supra.
11. 575 F.2d at 227.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Cities Serv. Co., 289 F. Supp. 133 (D. Mass. 1968), appeal
dismissed, 410 F.2d 662 (1st Cir. 1969), where such an order required preservation of the
acquired facilities during the pendency of litigation, and the defendant was not allowed to
sell any of the facilities it acquired prior to final judgment. The court stated that such a
partial sale would raise an insuperable obstacle to its ability to fashion an effective judgment
in the event the government succeeded on the merits. See also United States v. International
Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (1969), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971) (district
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tion centered on the availability of rescission as a potential remedy
under the Clayton Act. Thus, the issuance of the injunction was chal-
lenged on two grounds: first, that it had been based on an erroneous
legal premise, and second, that it had been an abuse of the district
court's discretion under the circumstances of the case. 13 Although the
issuance or withholding of a preliminary injunction is ordinarily left to
the discretion of the district court,14 it is reviewable by the Ninth Cir-
cuit if based upon an erroneous legal premise, as Aqua Media
charged. 15
.A. Due Process and the Clayton Act
The Coca-Cola court rejected several arguments grounded upon the
language of the Clayton Act. Defendant Aqua Media contended that
sellers could not be violators of section 7 of the Act.16 Further, Aqua
Media argued that the equitable powers for antitrust relief conferred on
the district courts by section 15 only authorized court actionprior to the
consummation of an acquisition. 7 Accordingly, Aqua Media con-
tended that the court was without authority to impose relief which
would affect Aqua Media, and that any imposition of such relief by the
court would constitute a denial of Aqua Media's right to due process of
law.
The Ninth Circuit noted that Aqua Media was correct in its initial
assertion that, technically, it was not a violator of section 7, as that
section only proscribes the act of acquiring, not that of selling.' 8 In-
deed, many of the cases cited by the court are in accordance with this
view. 9 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit broke new ground in relying on
court issued order preserving status quo pendente lite in circumstances where issuance of
preliminary injunction not warranted).
13. The Ninth Circuit construed Aqua Media's arguments as an implied attack on the
district court's use of discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. 575 F.2d at 231.
14. See Douglas v. Beneficial Finance Co., 469 F.2d 453, 454 (9th Cir. 1972).
15. See, e.g., id.; King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 425 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). See note 2 supra.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976). See note 3 supra.
18. 575 F.2d at 227.
19. See Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 1967) (complaint
dismissed as to seller corporation) ("§ 7 by its terms proscribes only the acquiring corpora-
tion."); United States v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., [1974] CCH TRADE CAs.J 75,061 (C.D. Cal.
1974) ("Section 7 of the Clayton Act... applies only to the purchaser of assets or stock and
not to the seller thereof."); In re Dean Foods Co., 70 F.T.C. 1146, 1290 (1966) ("It is clear
under the language of [section 7]... that the Clayton Act prohibition was directed solely




the sweeping language of section 15 of the Act,2" and the broad scope
of equity jurisdiction, to overcome this strict statutory argument.2 1 The
court cited with approval cases which specifically held that relief may
be granted not only against parties who are found to have violated sec-
tion 7, but also against others when necessary to eliminate the effects of
the acquisition which violated that section.21 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
became the first federal appellate court to acknowledge the availability
of the far-reaching remedy of rescission in section 7 cases, even though
such a remedy necessarily affects the interests of "technically ' 23 non-
violating sellers.
In its second statutory argument, Aqua Media contended that section
15 of the Act authorized court action against improper acquisitions
prior to their consummation. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argu-
ment, viewing it as an attempt to strain the meaning of the statutory
language.24 There is ample support for the Ninth Circuit's position.
The Supreme Court has held that the legality of a stock acquisition
under section 7 of the Act depends on whether, at the time of the suit,
there is a reasonable probability that the acquisition may lead to a re-
straint or a monopoly. 5 Indeed, in 1949, the Supreme Court allowed
the government to maintain a suit based on an acquisition which had
been completed in 1919.26 In Coca-Cola, the Ninth Circuit adhered to
the well established judicial rule of not limiting the scope of equitable
20. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976). See note 3 supra.
21. It is interesting to note that the Justice Department had previously predicted such a
conclusion. In a speech delivered during his tenure as Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Antitrust Division, William Orrick warned selling companies that they are not "home
free" when they succeed in consummating a merger or acquisition over Justice Department
opposition. It was the Antitrust Division's view that the selling company could be ordered
to reacquire the assets or stock which were illegally sold. E. ROCKEFELLER, ANTITRUST
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 246 (1974).
22. 575 F.2d at 229. See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 183 F. Supp. 220, 221 (E.D.
Wis. 1960) ("[T]he court has authority to grant relief not only against parties who are found
to have violated [section 7], but also against other parties if such relief is necessary to elimi-
nate the effects of an acquisition offensive to the statute."); United States v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co., [1966] CCH TRADE CAS. 71,872 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (court declined to rule that
rescission was unavailable as a matter of law simply because it affected seller).
23. See notes 16 & 17 supra and accompanying text.
24. See note 3 supra. Aqua Media read the terms "prevent" and "restrain" in the first
sentence of § 15 as authorizing court action only prior to § 7 violations. 575 F.2d at 230.
Statutory language, however, should not yield to light inferences or doubtful construction.
See Brown v. Swam, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 497, 503 (1836).
25. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957) ("Sec-
tion 7 is designed to arrest in its incipiency. . . restraints or monopolies in a relevant market
which, as a reasonable probability, appear at the time of suit likely to result from [that]
acquisition ... ").
26. Id. at 588.
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jurisdiction absent a clear and valid legislative command to the con-
trary.27 Moreover, the court's action is supported by numerous cases
which have consistently espoused the flexibility and comprehensiveness
of equitable jurisdiction.28
In light of both the applicable case law and the extensive powers of
courts of equity, the ease with which the Coca-Cola court overcame
these statutory arguments is not surprising. Nevertheless, the legislative
grant of judicial authority to impose affirmative relief against a party
who has technically not even violated the law warrants examination.
Section 15 of the Clayton Act reads, "Whenever it shall appear to the
court.. . that the ends of justice require that other parties should be-
brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned
.... "29 This language is identical to that used in section 5 of the
Sherman Act.30 By means of comparison, the Congressional inclusion
of that provision in the Sherman Act was to ensure nationwide service
of process, thus enabling a single court to resolve antitrust violations
which reached outside the court's actual territorial jurisdiction.3' It did
not, however, broaden the definition of parties capable of violating the
Sherman Act. The Congressional Record does not contain discussions
indicating the reasons for the inclusion of the identical language in sec-
tion 15 of the Clayton Act. Despite this lack of legislative guidance, the
Ninth Circuit read the language as evidencing a congressional conclu-
sion "that on occasion third parties whose conduct is not specifically
addressed by the Clayton Act would be so related to the anti-competi-
tive effects at which the act was directed that their presence would be
27. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1945) (delineating the scope of
the equitable powers of the federal courts to award relief against law violators); Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) ("The essence of equity jurisdiction has been [that]...
[filexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.").
28. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400-01 (1947) ("[Dis-
trict courts] are invested with large discretion to model their judgments to fit the exigencies
of the particular case.") See generally Lewis, Preliminary Injunctions in Government Section 7
Litigation, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1972); Note, Preliminary Relief/or the Government Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 79 HARv. L. REV. 391 (1965).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976). See note 3 supra.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
31. 21 CONG. REc. 2640-42 (1890). Pertinent portions of the legislative history read as
follows:
Mr. SPOONER [sponsor of the amendment, now § 5]: Mr. President, I offer this
amendment to cure what seems to me to be a very great defect in the bill.
• . . Manifestly to deal efficiently with a trust or combination of that character it must
be possible to bring into one action, into one court, the essential parties defendant.
*. . One object of the amendment is to provide that the court may bring in these




necessary in order to fashion complete relief."32
Thus, the Coca-Cola court interpreted section 15 as encompassing
both buyers and sellers when necessary to remedy section 7 violations.
However, a straightforward reading of section 7 reveals that it ad-
dresses only the acquiring corporation in an acquisition and that only
an acquiring corporation, therefore, is capable of violating the sec-
tion.33 Indeed, courts of equity are bound by such express statutory
provisions, and as such, they are not allowed to ignore or rewrite these
provisions through interpretation.34 Despite the statutory language, the
Coca-Cola court chose not to make a distinction between corporate
buyers and corporate sellers.
The use of section 15 of the Clayton Act to increase the type and
number of parties against whom relief can ultimately be imposed for
violations of section 7 could have widespread ramifications in both de-
termining and protecting against corporate liability in future antitrust
litigation. A decree of rescission could compel a corporate seller to re-
acquire a business which it had no desire to operate. In reliance on the
consummated sale of a particular business, the corporate seller may
well have distributed large sums of the purchase price received by it to
its shareholders or invested the funds in alternative business ventures.
Moreover, the corporate seller may have liquidated any support opera-
tions or equipment necessary to ensure the viable operation of the pre-
viously relinquished business. In United States v. Reed Roller Bit Co. ,3-
the district court was presented with a request for rescission of a trans-
action allegedly violative of section 7. The court noted some of the
serious impracticalities of rescission as a means of restoring competi-
tion36 following antitrust violations. These problems include, but are
not limited to, restoration of the original corporate operation, separa-
tion or "unscrambling" of the merged businesses, locating transferred
or terminated corporate executives and employees, and continuing via-
32. 575 F.2d at 228.
33. See note 2 supra. If such a construction of the statute is correct, then corporate sellers
could be affected by the remedy only through joinder in the action under either Fed. R. Civ.
P. 20, which allows party joinder if common questions of law or fact are present, or Fed. R.
Civ. P. 19, which could require a seller's presence if his absence might result in sufficient
harm to his interests.
34. See, e.g., Matson Navigation Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 352, 356 (1932) ("[Where]
the words of [a statute] are plain, [the court may not] add to or alter them to effect a purpose
which does not appear on its face or from its legislative history.").
35. 274 F. Supp. 573, 591-92 (W.D. Okla. 1967). The court ultimately found it unneces-
sary to rule on the remedy of rescission. Id. at 590.
36. It must be remembered that the antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of com-
petition. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
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ble operation in the face of the possibility that both the business com-
munity and the public are aware that the corporation had no desire to
return to the market.
To avoid the potentially devastating effects of an order of rescission
upon corporate sellers in future sales, a pre-sale screening by corporate
sellers appears to be a necessity. As the corporate buyer surely screens
the businesses which it seeks to acquire prior to entering negotiations
for sale, corporate sellers should undertake a similar task. They should
assess section 7 problems that might arise in the context of a sale to any
of the corporate buyers negotiating for the purchase of the seller's busi-
ness operations. Clearly, with respect to corporate acquisitions which
may fall within the purview of section 7 of the Clayton Act, the doc-
trine of caveat emptor has been supplemented by caveat venditor in the
Ninth Circuit.
B. The LegalAvailabilily of Rescission
Section 15 of the Clayton Act imposes a duty on the Department of
Justice to bring suits in equity to prevent and restrain violations of the
Act. The government has instituted a wide variety of equitable actions
under section 15 to enjoin acquisitions which it believed were in viola-
tion of section 7 of the Act.37 Court-imposed equitable remedies for
antitrust violations have included divestiture,38 prohibition39 and inval-
idation4° of contracts, dissolution,4 1 divorcement,42 and an endless ar-
37. See, e.g., United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651, 659-60 (D.N.J. 1964)
(injunction against consummation of agreement to purchase truck manufacturing business
by competitor); In re Union Oil Co., 225 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (court annulment of
civil investigation of proposed acquisitions which, if consummated, might have violated
Clayton Act); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 247 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Mo.
1962),fnalIjudgment, 247 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Mo. 1964) (injunction prohibiting acquisition
of aluminum fabricator stock by large aluminum producer).
38. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961) (court-
ordered divestiture of acquisition which violated § 7 of Clayton Act). See note 5 supra.
39. See, ag., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 257 (D.R.I. 1964) ("In-
junction against continued adherence to the [contractual] patterns formed in violation of law
is not merely appropriate but necessary to accomplish the declared objects of the antitrust
laws.").
40. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (corporate con-
tracts held violative per se of § 1 of Sherman Act and § 3 of Clayton Act).
41. See, e.g., Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952). Dissolution is one of the basic
and most frequently used remedies in monopolization suits. The term generally refers to
situations involving the dissolving of an illegal combination or association. The Supreme
Court has stated that dissolution helps put an end to the violative conspiracy, deprives the
antitrust defendants of the benefits of the conspiracy, and renders impotent the monopoly
which violated the Act. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128-29
(1948).
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ray of equitable means to meet the end of restraining antitrust
violations. 43 Additionally, courts have-not hesitated to order all ancil-
lary equitable relief which is deemed reasonably necessary to remedy
antitrust violations.' The equitable powers of the federal courts have
been declared to be as comprehensive as the condition to be rectified
requires. 41 In a leading antitrust case, Ford Motor Co. v. United
States,46 the Supreme Court declared that in remedying violations of
section 7, the extent of relief to be provided should be such as to "cure
the ill effects of the illegal conduct, and assure the public freedom from
its continuance. ' 47 To this end, the Supreme Court has consistently
granted the federal courts a broad scope in shaping relief remedies.
48
While rescission has traditionally been one of the remedies utilized
by courts of equity, the availability of rescission in the enforcement of
section 7 of the Clayton Act had never, prior to Coca-Cola, been deter-
mined to be appropriate.49 The Supreme Court, however, has stated
that "[t]hose who violate the Act may not reap the benefit of their viola-
tions and avoid an undoing of their unlawful project on the plea of
hardship or inconvenience."50 Moreover, the equitable powers invoked
by the federal courts have been particularly broad and expansive when
public, rather than private, interests are involved.5
42. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). Divorce-
ment is a form of divestiture designed to secure relief from integrated ownership or control.
See generally Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of
Antitrust, 27 IND. L.J. 1 (1951).
43. Equitable remedies developed as a supplement to the law, providing relief where legal
remedies were inadequate. See generalo 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1-42a
(5th ed. 1941); Note, Developments in the Lan-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994 (1965).
44. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972) (judicial imposition of
elaborate purchase requirements in conjunction with order of divestiture deemed necessary
to effectively restore competition); Ekco Prods. Co. v. F.T.C., 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965)
(housewares manufacturer directed to furnish such technical and marketing information as
may be reasonably requested by purchaser in addition to other equitable relief).
45. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 573 (1972).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 575 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 78 (1950)).
48. See, e.g., .. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (affirming power of federal
courts to grant all necessary remedial relief for violations of Securities Exchange Act);
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960) (affirming power of district
court to order reimbursement of wages as part of remedy for violations of Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act).
49. According to the Coca-Cola court, "The availability of rescission of an acquisition
[allegedly] violative of § 7 of the Clayton Act [was] a matter of first impression in the federal
circuit courts. . . ." 575 F.2d at 227.
50. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944).
51. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 383 (1965) (quoting
Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937)) ("Courts of equity may, and
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The Coca-Cola court had considerable support for its conclusion that
rescission is to be included in a court's arsenal of equitable remedies in
the enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act. It is an established
principle in equity jurisprudence that courts may order the rescission of
illegal and unenforceable contracts where that remedy will be in the
furtherance of justice and sound public policy.52 In the antitrust field,
case law indicates that "once the government has successfully borne the
considerable burden of establishing a violation of law, all doubts as to
the remedy are to be resolved in its favor." 3 Illustrative of this broad
remedial power are cases holding that federal courts, with all their
traditional equity powers, may even prohibit lawful conduct where nec-
essary to remedy antitrust violations.5 4
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's affirmation of rescission as an
available antitrust remedy did not occur in the absence of prior judicial
consideration of the use of rescission. The remedy of rescission under
section 7 had previously been considered by several federal district
courts which eventually decided on other more appropriate forms of
relief.55 Rescission has been approved and ordered by the Supreme
Court, albeit in the context of securities regulation.5 6 The Supreme
Court has justified the use of the remedy of rescission as an exercise of
a court's equitable powers.5" In a leading case in the antitrust field
which addressed remedial relief, United States v. EL du Pont de
Nemours & Co.,"8 the Supreme Court ruled that in acquisitions which
frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public
interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.").
52. See 2 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 941-42 (5th ed. 1941).
53. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 334 (1961).
54. See, e.g., United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 88-89 (1950) (in affording
relief from violation of Sherman Act, trial court may prohibit acts which are entirely proper
when viewed in isolation); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 724
(1944) (decree cancelling a distributor's license agreements and enjoining the execution of
any similar contract) ("Equity has power to eradicate the evils of a condemned scheme by
prohibition of the use of admittedly valid parts of an invalid whole.").
55. See United States v. Reed Roller Bit Co., 274 F. Supp. 573, 585-92 (W.D. Okla. 1967)
(court declined to determine whether rescission is generally available as it would not have
been an effective form of relief on the facts of the case); United States v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., [1966] CCH TRADE CASES 1 71,872 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (court declined to grant rescission
of acquisition as a form of preliminary relief, but did not rule that rescission was not avail-
able as a matter of law).
56. See Jl. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-35 (1964). Borak involved a violation of
a securities exchange act which resulted in rescission of a fraudulently obtained merger.
Though the case involved a different statute and arguably involved no non-violating parties,
it is relevant in showing that rescission is a workable and appropriate form of equitable
relief in the protection of the public interest as determined by the Supreme Court.
57. Id. at 433.
58. 366 U.S. 316 (1961). -
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violate section 7, "[t]he very words of § 7 suggest that an undoing of the
acquisition is a natural remedy.
59
Clearly, due to the early stage of the proceedings in Coca-Cola,6" the
relief which will ultimately be deemed necessary may be determined
and fashioned by a wide variety of factors that only a trial on the merits
will bring forward. The Ninth Circuit noted the possible culpability of
Aqua Media as one such potential factor.61 For example, if Aqua Me-
dia had been aware, prior to the consummation of the proposed acqui-
sition, that such acquisition would be violative of section 7, then a
decree of rescission which would force Aqua Media to reacquire the
business would be particularly appropriate.
Moreover, the validity of the acquisition involved could be chal-
lenged under other antitrust statutes which might then be controlling in
determining appropriate relief.62 Such antitrust statutes may be ap-
plied either instead of or in addition to section 7.63 An amended com-
plaint would then be possible if further violations were charged or
discovered.6' These and other developments may arise during a trial
on the merits; thus, whether rescission, rather than another equitable
remedy, should be granted cannot be adequately decided at the stage in
the proceedings at which the interlocutory appeal in Coca-Cola oc-
curred. Nevertheless, rescission may have inherent advantages as a
form of relief assuming that it is available.65
The ability of district courts to control illegal acquisitions has been
strengthened by the Ninth Circuit's recognition of rescission as a possi-
ble remedy under the Clayton Act. This is consistent with past judicial
practice; courts have long been free to devise effective decrees to ac-
commodate the necessity of complete relief with a minimum of eco-
nomic hardships. 66 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has specifically
59. Id. at 329.
60. See note 10 supra.
61. 575 F.2d at 231-32.
62. Chief among such other statutes are: 1) § 1 of the Sherman Act which prohibits unrea-
sonable restraints of trade; 2) § 2 of the Sherman Act which proscribes monopolization and
attempts to monopolize; and 3) § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act which pro-
hibits unfair methods of competition.
63. The Department of Justice states that although acquisitions may also be challenged
under the Sherman Act, the challenge will generally be made under § 7 of the Clayton Act.
JusricE DEPT. MERGER GUIDELINES § 1 (1968).
64. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (complaints are not to be dismissed
unless no set of facts in support of claim will entitle plaintiff to relief).
65. Rescission ensures the availability of a purchaser and restores the assets to a party
who has a thorough knowledge of the business. Furthermore, it is expedient as negotiations
need not occur. See generally H. BLACK, supra note 5.
66. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1972), in which the
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held that economic considerations should only influence the choice as
among two or more effective antitrust remedies, as the public interest in
antitrust relief must remain paramount to private interests. 67 Surely, if
the final decree accomplishes less than complete antitrust relief, "the
Government has won a lawsuit and lost a cause."
68
IV. CONCLUSION
Federal courts have carefully and consistently avoided utilizing their
extensive equitable powers indiscriminately in fashioning antitrust re-
lief. This judicial restraint has provided for a balance to the wide de-
gree of discretion possessed by the judiciary under the historical
principles of equity. In the antitrust field, courts have maintained all of
their traditional equitable powers. The rationale and holding of the
Coca-Cola case is demonstrative of the continued vitality of these equi-
table powers in providing for effective antitrust relief.
The ruling that federal district courts, in remedying Clayton Act vio-
lations, may order rescission of acquisitions even though a "techni-
cally" non-violating seller will be affected is a "first" in the federal
circuit courts. However, it appears to have been an inescapable conclu-
sion in light of the broad development and flexible history of equity
jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit's ease in overcoming strained statutory
arguments is further indicative of this comprehensive power. In the
antitrust field, the inherent power of a court of equity to design flexible
decrees sufficient to restore competition continues to be of utmost im-
portance. The Ninth Circuit's recognition of rescission as an equitable
power available to the federal district courts in redressing violations of
the Clayton Act can only strengthen the court's ability to restore com-
petition and, at the same time, afford effective protection to the public
and all parties to antitrust litigation.
James P. Montague*
Supreme Court held that it was proper to require an auto manufacturer to submit to exten-
sive remedies to reestablish the acquired firm as a factor in the market.
67. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326-27 (1961).
68. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947).
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